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CORNELL LAW QUARTERLY
VOLUME XVI

JUNE, I93I

NUMBER 4

LIFE ESTATES WITH POWER TO CONSUME:
RIGHTS OF CREDITORS, PURCHASERS AND
iREMAINDERMEN: A STUDY OF NEW YORK
REAL PROPERTY LAW SECTIONS 149-153
HORACE

E.

WHITESIDE*

MORTIMER S. EDELSTEINt
INTRODUCTORY

A life owner of real or personal property has, by virtue of his estate
or interest, the right to the income or use and enjoyment of the property
during his life. Neither he nor his creditors can ordinarily consume
the corpus or sell out the remainderman or reversioner. If, however,
the life owner has been given a legal power to consume or dispose of
the corpus or principal for his own benefit, both purchasers and remaindermen are interested in the interpretation and scope of the life
tenant's power. Likewise, the rights of his -creditors, as well as the
rights of the creditors of the remainderman, may be affected. It is
the object of this paper to point out briefly the rights and powers of
the several parties in this situation, with special reference to the
New York statutes! It will be necessary first to outline three typical
situations in which the problems suggested -above may arise.
TYPICAL SITUATIONS

The common law recognized as valid a conveyance or devise
of land to, X and his heirs, for the use of such person or persons as
A might subsequently appoint; or for the use of B and his heirs
until A should appoint the land to others, and then to the use'of A's
appointees! (2) The commoin law also permitted a conveyance or
(I)

*Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
fCornell Law School, ig3i.
'For a collection of cases dealing with the rights and duties of the life tenant
with a power to anticipatd or enjoy the principal, in states which do not have a
statutory system of powers, see (1919) 2 A. L. R. 1243; (1923) 27 ibid. 138r;
(193o) 69 ibid. 825.
'Co. LIrr. (Butler & Hargreave's ist Am. ed. 1853) *27ib, n. i, VII. i;
REvE-s, REAL PROPERTY, SPEcIAL SUBJECTS (1904) § 624. For a general historical treatment of powers, see 7 HoLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGmisa LAW
(1926) 149 et. seq.
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devise to X and his heirs, for the use of A for life, with a power in A
to appoint.the remainder in fee, followed by a gift over in default
of appointment.'
In both these situations, A's creditors could not reach the land over
which A had the general power of appointment. He could not be
compelled to execute his power in their favor.' In equity, however,
the rule was laid down that A ought to execute his power of disposition in favor of hig creditors, if he executed it at all. Consequently,
if A executed his power, equity treated as done that which A ought
to have done and secured the property for his creditors, at least as
against a volunteer.* The estate of the remainderman in the gift
over could not be reached by A's creditors unless A executed his
power.
These rules were applied to a conveyance or bequest of personal
property to A for life, with, power to consume, or to dispose of the
principal or corpus for his own benefit, followed by gift over to B
of what remained at A's death. If A did not dispose of the property
aI SUGDEN, POWES (3d Am. ed. 1856) *I2o; see KALES, ESTATES FUTURE
INTERESTS (2d ed. 192o) § 726 (legal life estate with a power, citing Illinois
cases).
4
KALEs, op. cit. supra note 3, § 638; 4 KENT, CoMM. (i4th ed. i8p6) *339-.
340; Brandeis v. Cochrane, 112 U. S. 344, 5 Sup. Ct. 194 (1884) ; United States
v. Field, 255 U. S. 257, 264, 41 Sup. Ct 256, 258 (1920); Holmes v. Coghill,
7 Ves. 498 (1802); In re Harvey's Estate, L. R. 13 Ch. Div. 216 (1878).
Cf. WILLIAMS, REAL PROPERTY (24th ed. 1926) 456, dealing with the rights
of creditors under the common law and as modified by English statutes.
In FARWELL, POWERS (1874) it is said at 271, "...both real and personal
estate over which a man has a general power of appointment becomes assets
for the payment of his' debts, if the power has been validly exercised in favor
of volunteers.. .The donee of the power having by his appointment displaced the
title of those taking estates subject to the power, and so rendered the property
his own absolutely, the court treats it in like manner, follows this out to all its
legitimate consequences, and treats his rights acquired under a general power
as equivalent to absolute ownership." See 2 SUGDEN, 10c. cit. supra note 3;
(1929)

59 A. L. R. 151o; Brandeis v. Cochrane, supra note 4, at 352, 5 Sup. Ct.,

at 197; United States v. Field, supra note 4, at 263, 41 Sup. Ct. at 258.
'SUGDEN, 10c. cit. supra note 3, says that the rule for real and personal property
is the same. To the same effect, see KALES, 10c. cit. supra note 3; HOLDSWORTH, op. cit. supra note 2, at 159; Reith v. Seymour, 4 Russ. 263 (1828).
It is to be noted, however, that the common law did make certain distinctions
with reference to gifts of personalty. Thus in 2 JARMAN, WILLS (7th Eng. ed.
1930) 1156, it is said that "[tihere are some cases in which a combination of a
life interest in personalty, with a power of appointment or disposition over the
corpus, may in effect be an absolute gift, without any necessity for the donee
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in the manner provided, his creditors were without remedy, and B's
claim to the undisposed of portion was protected.' No distinction
seems to have been made between a life estate to A with a power
of appointment over the remainder, and a life estate to A with power
to consume or sell the principal and use the proceeds for his own
benefit. In each case, A's creditors could reach the corpus or principal only if A exercised his power. If A did not exercise his power,
the creditors were without remedy
(3) The common law thought it was wholly illogical to give
property to A in fee, and at the same time take it away by an
executory devise over to B if A failed to alienate or devise the
property. And 'so, where an absolute interest in real or personal
property was conveyed or devised to A, followed by a gift over to B,
if A failed to alienate or consumd the property during his lifetime,'
or upon A's death intestate, the common law decisions reached the
of the power either to exercise or release it." This is often a question of the
testator's intention as interpreted by the courts. See ibid. 1157.
The difference between power and property is explained in Ex parte Gilchrist,
17 Q. B. D. 521 (1886). By the English Married Women's Property Act, married women became subject to bankruptcy in respect of their separate property.
The question before the court was whether the bankrupt donee of an unexecuted
power of appointment had "separate property" within the meaning of the Act.
It was held that she did not. See the opinion of Fry, L. J., at 53o et. seq. For

the distinction between property and a power, see also GOODEVE AND POTTER,
MODERN LAW OF REAL PROPERTY (1929) 344. Cf. Bradly v. Westcott, 13 Ves.
445 (18o7).
See also KALEs, op. cit. supra note 3, §§486-494, dealing with life interests
in specific chattels personal which may be consumed.
72 SUGDEN, op. cit supra note 3, at *199, 200; Keniston v. Mayhew, 169
Mass. 166, 47 N. E. 612 (1897); Russell v. Eubanks, 84 Mo. 82 (1884);
Henninger v. Henninger, 202 Pa. 207, 209, 51 Atl. 749, 750 (19o2); Pennock v. Pennock, L. R. 13 Eq. 144 (1871); In re Thomson's Estate, L. R.
13 'Ch. Div. 144 (1878); and see 2 SUGDEN, supra at *124, to the effect that a
contract to execute a power in favor of a remainderman (where that is possible)
will be enforced in favor of the remainderman.
'Supra note 4.See Cutting v. Cutting, 86 N. Y. 522, 529 (1881) "... [W]here
a person has a general power of appointment by will over property and has
exercised the power, the property thus appointed forms a part of his assets,
and is subject to the claims of creditors;..." Conversely, if thq life tenant did
not execute the power, his creditors could not reach the property, REEvEs, op.
cit. supra note 2, § 632.
'KALES, op. cit. supra note 3, §719; GRAY, RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION OF
PROPERTY (2d ed. 1895) §74c et. seq.; Ide v. Ide, 5 Mass. 499 (18o9) ; Shaw
v. Ford, L. R. 7 Ch. Div. 669 (1877). As to personalty see GRAY, supra §65

et. seq.
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result that A took the fee absolutely, and B's interest was void."
The result was the same if the gift over to B was of that portion of
the property. undisposed of at A's death." Three reasons were given
for these results: (a) it was said the gift over was repugnant to
the absolute interest previously given to A;" (b) it was said that an
executory devise could not be created to take effect upon the exercise
of any of the rights incident to the prior estate, and that descent upon
intestacy was a necessary incident of A's estate ;" (c) as to personal
property, it was said that the interest of the donee in the gift over
was too uncertain, and the difficulty of proving what remained at A's
death too great!' The first reason suggested is based upon a purely
metaphysical concept; the second may possess some merit, particularly
in respect of real property ; the third reason has considerable merit,
but is applicable only to personal property.'
This doctrine was followed in New York in Jackson v. Robbins,"
where Chancellor Kent reasoned that an executory devise, limited
"GRAY, op. cit. supra note 9, §§57, 58 et. seq.; Jackson v. Robins, I6 Johns.
537 (N. Y. 18ig); Ross v. Ross, x Jac. & W. 154 (i819); Holmes v. Godson,
8 De G. M. & G. 152 (1856).

"Watkins v. Williams, 3 Macn. & G. 622 (1851).
"Ross v. Ross, supra note 1o (personal property) ; Holmes v. Godson, supra
note io (real property) ; and see, GRAY, op. cif. supra note 9, §74 et. seq. Professor Gray also points out, §74f, that no judge has ever given a rational explanation for the rule, and notable judges have spoken of it with thinly veiled
contempt.
'Shaw v. Ford, supra note 9.
"Watkins v. Williams, supra notd ii, where Lord Chancellor Truro said, at
629: "Now, it is a rule that, where a money fund is given to a person absolutely, a condition can not be annexed to the gift, that so much as he shall not
dispose of shall go over to another person. Apart from any supposed incongruity, a notion which savours of metaphysical refinement rather than of anything substantial, one reason which may be assigned in support of the expediency
of this rule is, that in many cases it might be very difficult, and even impossible, to ascertain whether any part of the fund remained undisposed of or not;
since, if the person to whom the absolute interest is given left any personalty,
it might be wholly uncertain whether it were a part of the precise fund which,
was the subject of the condition or not." Note that as to personalty the New
York Court seems to suggest that the remaindermen have the burden of tracing
the funds. Seaward v. Davis, 198 N. Y. 415, 421-422, 91 N. E. 11o7, ilo8

(191o).
"GRAY, op. cit. supra note 9, §64.
"'Ibid. §65 et. seq., where the writer points out that the cases do not hold the
same way with regard to personalty, not because of the difficulty of tracing
personalty, but because the courts simply.follow the realty holdings.
"Supra note IO, at 583.
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upon a contingency within the power of the first taker to defeat,
was inconsistent and repugnant. This reasoning was also employed
in Van Home v. Campbell,' which was decided in 1885 but involved
a will that became operative in 1791.
While this rule of the common law was not expressly abrogated
by the Revised Statutes,' the life has been taken out of it for all
'"ioo N. Y. 287, 3 N. _. 316, 771 (1885), reargument4 denied in ioI N. Y.
608, 3 N. E. 9oi (I885).

IGR&Y, op. cit. supra note 9, says: "§56 g. [The New York Revised Statutes,
Part 2, c. I, tit. 2, art. I, §32, p. 725, provides that 'no expectant estate can be

defeated or barred by any alienation or other act of the owner of the inteimediate or precedent estate, by disseisin, forfeiture, surrender, merger, or otherwise.' The revisers doubtless were thinking of cases on the destruction of contingent remainders, and there is no reason to suppose they had in mind such
limitations as are here discussed. But the lower courts of New York have held
that, under the Revised Statutes, upon an estate in fee a gift over of what the
devisee has not conveyed in his lifetime is good. Greyston v. Clark, 41 Hun,
125. Simpson v. French, 6 Demarest, io8. Leggett v. Firth, 53 Hun, 152.
Baumgras v. Baumgras, 5 Delehanty, 8. In Griswold v. Warner, 51 Hun, 12,
however, such a gift was held bad; and no suggestion was made by the court
as to any change being wrought by the Revised Statutes. Thd point does not
seem to have been passed upon by the Court of Appeals. Cf. Leggett v. Firth,
132 N. Y. 7]"

An analysis of the cases cited by Professor Gray shows: (1) in the Baumgras decision the court interpreted the language of the will as being a life
estate plus a power to use and consume the principal, and this holding is based
on Leggett v. Firth, in the Court of Appeals. (2) In the Greyston case and the
Simpson case the lower court did state that the common law rule of repugnancy
was abolished by §57 of the N. Y. R. P. L. It is to be noted, however, with
respect to the history of these opinions, that (a) the Greyston case was cited in
Crozier v. Bray, i2o N. Y. 366, 24 N. E. 712 (i89o), but here again the Court
of Appeals interpreted the language of the litigated will as a life estate plus a
power to consume. The Greyston case was also cited by the Appellate Division
in Hallinan v. Slillen, 227 App. Div. 125, 128, 237. N. Y. Supp. i41, i44 (Ist
Dept. 1929). However, this case was reversed by the Court of Appeals in a
memorandum decision, 253 N. Y. 550,

71 N. E. 777 (I930), on grounds that

are not clear. (b) The Simpson case cites Terry v. Wiggins, 47 N. Y. 512
(1872), as authority for the proposition that the common law rule of repugnancy
was abolished by N. Y. R. P. L. §57, but at most this statement is obiter because
the court in the Terry case interpreted the will as being a life estate plus a
power to consume. The Court in-the Simpson case, cites Wager v. Wager, 96
N. Y. 164 (1884), as sustaining the general proposition, but in the Wager, case,
at 174, we find this interesting statement: "When provisions are irreconcilably
conflicting, one must give way to the other, and that must be adopted which
seems to accord most clearly with the testator's primary object in executing
the instrument, but when by limiting the character of the first estate; the second
may also be preserved, it is clearly the duty of the court to do so' unless such a
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practical purposes by the mysterious processes of interpretation. The
courts have evaded the common law rule of repugnancy by construing an apparently absolute gift to A with power to convey and consume, when followed by a gift ove to,'B of all that remains at A's
death, as only a life interest in A coupled with a power to dispose of
the remainder, followed by a valid remainder in expectancy to B."
However, in the recent case of Tillman v. Ogren,' while the Court
construction is subversive of the general scheme of the will, or forbidden by
some inflexible rule of law." (c) As to Leggett v. Firth, cited by Gray, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the holding of the lower court to the effect that
the gift over was not void for repugnancy, but the Court's affirmation seems to
be based on interpreting the language of the will as creating a life estate pis a
power to dispose.
The notes to REv. STAT. § 32 (Part 2. Ch. i.) which is now § 57 of the R. P.L.,
malke it perfectly clear that the Revisers in proposing this section, had in mind
simply the technicalities and difficulties of the common law rule of destructibility, and an intention to abolish it, to reduce expectant estates to the same
class, and to make contingent remainders indestructiblein the same manner as
executory devises. "The object of this section", as stated by the Revisers, "is
to extend to every species of future limitation, the rule that is now well established in relation to an executory devise, namely that it cannot be barred or prevented from taking effect by any mode whatever. If it is consistent with public
policy that the owners of lands should be permitted to restrain their alienation,
by the creation of future contingent estates, is seems reasonable that they should
be protected in the exercise of the power thus given, and that the law should
not suffer their intentions to be frustrated by any fraud or device whatever.
Where a future limitation is called an executory devise, it receives full protection from the law, yet no reason is perceived why the intentions of the party
creating a future estate, ought not to be held equally sacred, whatever may be
the technical name of the estate so created."
There is no doubt that the doctrine of repugnancy which is more than a
hundred years old is still a live issue in litigation; see, for example, the discussion by Valente J. (in 1929), in Hallinan v. Skillen, .supra.
"Leggett v. Firth, 132 N. Y. 7, 29 N. E. 950 (1892). In Matter of Blauvelt,
131 N. Y. 249, 3o N. E. i94 (I892), B, by will, gave all property to W with
permission to sell "as to her shall seem just" 'This was held to be a life estate
plus a power to consume. Accord: Seaward v. Davis, supra note 14. See Trustees of Theological Seminary of !Auburn v. Kellogg, i6 N. Y. 83 (1857) where
there was a gift of real and personal property to Chloe, heirs and assigns, but
if she die without issue to the seminary. Title vested in a guardian who had
the power to apply proceeds of the estate for support of Chloe. It was held that
the legacy to the seminary was not repugnant because the guardian had only
a conditional rather than an absolute power to dispose. See also 'the dissent of
Laughlin, J., in Kelley v. Hogan, 71 App. Div. 343, 76 N. Y. Supp. 5 (1st
Dept. 1902).

N. Y. 495, 125 N. E. 821
N. E. 922 (i92o).

227

127

(i92o),

reargment denied in

228

N. Y. 559,
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of Appeals stated that the common law rule had been abolished, they
reached the same result as the common law upon the ground that, as
a matter of interpretation, the testator did not intend the estate of
the first taker to be cut down, and the gift over was therefore in
fact repugnant.' This is indeed a fine distinction.
Thus the common law doctrine of repugnancy has been emasculated
and the cases which formerly fell under its condemnation are generally assimilated to type (2) above: that is, a conveyance or devise
of real or personal property to A for life, with a power in A to
appoint or dispose of the remainder for his own benefit, followed by
a gift over in default of appointment, or a gift over of all that remains
undisposed of at A's death.
As we have seen, situations (i) and (2) presented problems in
the common law of powers. Situation (3) did not, at common law,
present any problem in powers.'a It is to be noted in the latter, however, that When the courts obviated the harshness of the common law
rule of repugnancy by construing the absolute estate of the first
taker as a life estate plus an added power, they subjected this case
to the hazards of the law of powers. This type of gift is a convenient
means of providing for the testator's wife or, other dependents, for
life, with the added flexible feature of enabling them to encroach on
the principal or dispose of the remainder, with a gift over of all that
remains at their death. But after thus changing the interest of the
first taker from an absolute estate to a life estate plus a power, the
courts were compelled to look to the law of powers in interpreting
the rights of creditors, purchasers and remaindermen. We are now
prepared to discuss the effect of the New York Statute upon the
rights of the various parties in the three cases outlined.
TiEi

STATUTORY SYSTE-7 OF POWERS

A statutory system of powers was enacted by the New York legislature in I828,' as part of that chapter of the Revised Statutes which

"InMatter

of Ithaca Trust Co., 22o N. Y. 437, 441, II6 N. E. i02, io3

(1917), the court said, Without referring to §57 of the R. P. L., "A remainder
can not be limited upon ,An absolute estate in fee. Where a gift is provided by
will and such gift is intended to be absolute, a gift over is repugnant to such
absolute gift and void and the purported gift over must be treated as a mere
expression of a wish or desire regarding the distribution of such part of the
gift as may remain undisposed of at the death -of the donee." This was quoted
with approval in Tillman v. Ogren, supra note 21.
"aCf. PROPERTY RESTATEMENT (Am. L. Inst. 593i) TENTATIVE DRAFT No. 3 §
155, Comment C.
2The statutory system of powers was contained in Part II, CIL I, Title II,
Art. III, of the Revised Statutes. It is now embodied in N. Y. CONS. LAWs
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embodied far-reaching reforms in the law of real property." The
Revisers, in notes appended to the article on powers, tell us the
reasons for the reforms proposed and the objects sought to be accomplished. They say, in part:'
"If the first and second Articles of this Title are adopted, a new
regulation of powers in relation to lands, becomes indispensable,
since it is from the statute of uses that such powers, as they are
c. 52 (Real Prop. Law) §§13o-r82 incl. For convenience, all future references
in this article will be made to the sections of the Real Property Law; without
reference to the corresponding sections of the Revised Statutes. Unless otherwise stated, a reference to a statutory section is intended as a reference to the
Real Property Law.
The following states have also adopted a statutory system of powers and
have made changes as indicated:ALA. CODE ANN. (x928) §6928 is substantially like N. Y. R. P. L. §r49. (See
the Annotation to this section of the Alabama law). §§6929-3o are substantially like N. Y. R. P. L. §§I5o-151. §6931 combines §§152-153 of the N. Y.
R. P. L. into one section defining absolute power of disposition. D. C. CODE
(1929) tit 25, §§395-398 incl.; Micr. ComP. LAWS (1929) §§130O3-13007 incl.;
MrxN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) §§8ii5-8riq incl.; N. D. ComP. LAws ANN. (@913)
are substantially like §§I49-I53 of the N. Y. R. P. L.
§§5421-5425 incl.,
OxIA.'CoMP. STAT. ANN. (1921) §§8522-8525 incl. are substantially like §§r4g152, N. Y. R. P. L. §8526 which corresponds to N. Y. R. P. L. §153 says:
"Every power of disposition is deemed absolute, by means of which the holder is
enabled in his lifetime to dispose of the entire fee, in possssion or expectancy,
for his own benefit." S. D. ComP., LAws (1929) §§426-429 incl. are substantially like §§149-152 of the N. Y. R. P. L. §43o which corresponds to §153 of
the N. Y. R. P. L. makes the same change that Oklahoma does, supra. Wis.
STAT. (1927) §§232.08-232.I2 are substantially like §§r4g-153 of N. Y. R. P. L.
'The legislature authorized a general revision of the statutes of New York
on Nov. 27, 1824. James Kent, Erastus Root and Benjamin F. Butler were appointed revisers, but Kent declined, and John Duer was appointed to the
vacancy by Gov. Yates. In 1825 the two younger revisers, Duer and Butler,
asked and received a grant of larger power, and thereafter they had practically
a free hand in codifying the laws of the state. Root having retired, Henry
Wheaton was substituted, but he resigned in 1827, and John C. Spencer was
appointed to fill his place, April 21, 18:27. All of Part One of the Revised
Statutes and all of Part Two except Chapter I, were adopted by the legislature
in a special session, which began Sept ii, 1827, and continued for fifty-three
days. The work was continued in the regular session of 1828 and another special
session in the autumn. The entire body of the Revised Statutes was adopted 'on
December 1o, 1828, to take effect on January I, 183o.
"The notes of the revisers will be found in their report to the legislature
(1828), and in the second and third editions of the Revised Statutes. An interesting and valuable account of the revisers and their work will be found in BuTLER,
THE REVISION AND THE REVIsERS (r889). The discussion of Powers may be
found in 3 REVISED STATUTzs OF NEv YORK (2d ed. 1836) 588-9.
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now constituted, derive their efficacy.t] We regard it as one of
the chief benefits to result from the abolition of uses, that it
affords an opportunity of placing the doctrine of powers on
rational grounds, by bringing them to the state of out society,
and the policy of our institutions.
"The law of powers, as all who have attempted to master it, will
readily admit, is probably the, most intricate labyrinth in all our
jurisprudence. Few, in the course of their studies, have been
called to enter it, who have not found it difficult to grope their
way in its numerous and winding passages. In plain language,
it abounds pre-eminently in useless distinctions and refinements,
difficult to be understood, and difficult to be applied, by which a
subject, in its own nature free from embarrassment, is exceedingly perplexed and darkened...
"Nor is it merely because it is mysterious and complex, that a
reform in this part of the law is desirable. It is liable to still
more serious objections, since, as will appear in the course of our
remarks, it affords the ready means of evading the most salutary provisions of our statutes. It avoids all the forrmlities
wisely required in the execution of deeds and wills, frustrates
the protection meant to be given to creditors and purchasers,
and eludes nearly all the checks by which secrecy and fraud, in
the alienation of lands, are sought to be prevented.
"The present division of powers, is into powers: i. Appendant
or appurtenant. 2. Collateral or in gross. 3. Simply collateral."
After commenting upon this common law classification, and pointing out how at common law, by means of powers, lands were placed
beyond the reach of the creditors of the grantor as well as of the
creditors of the grantee, the notes then contain the following paragraph with reference to the protection of creditors:
"That a change of the existing law is here not merely proper,
but necessary, will be admitted by all; and it is probably needless to offer any remarks in favor of the regulations that we
propose. In reason and good sense, there is no distinction between the absolute power of disposition and the absolute ownership; and to make such a distinction, to the injury of creditors,
may be very consistent with technical rules, but is a flagrant
breach of the plainest maxims of equity and justice. There is
a moral obligation on every man, to apply his property to the
payment of his debts; and the law becomes an engine of fraud,
when it permits this obligation to be evaded by a verbal distinction. It is an affront to common sense to say, that a man
has no property in that which he may sell 'when he chooses, and
dispose of the proceeds at his pleasure. We apprehend the legislature will have no difficulty in declaring, tha. so far as creditors
'REEVES,

loc. cit. supra note

2.
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and purchasers are concerned, the power of disposition shall be
deemed equivalent to the actual ownership. It may perhaps be
doubted, whether a general power to devise, annexed to a previous
estate, should be considered an absolute power of disposition;
but there are obvious means, by which, with the aid of this
power, the tenant for life or years may acquire, even in his
lifetime, the entire domination of the property."
For the accomplishment of these objects, the Revisers proposed,
and the legislature adopted, a statutory system of powers, purporting
to abolish entirely the common law system. A new classification of
powers was adopted, that is, general and special, beneficial and in
trust. A general power was defined as one authorizing the transfer
or incumbrance of a fee, by either a conveyance, will or a charge, in
favor of any grantee whatever.' A power was called special when
the class of persons to whom the disposition could be made was
limited, or when the power authorized the transfer or incumbrance
of an estate less than a fee.' A power was defined as beneficial
where no person, other than the grantee thereof had any interest in
its execution;' as in trust, where some person or class of, persons,
other than the grantee thereof, was designated as entitled to the

proceeds or benefits.'

I

We are particularly concerned with the sections in which the Re-

visers provided for the protection of creditors, purchasers, incumbrancers and renmfaindermen'

These are now contained in Real

IN. Y. R. P. L. §134.
2N. Y. R. P. L. §135.

'ON. Y. R. P. L. §136.

IN. Y. R. P. L. §137.
"'t is to be noted that these sections (149-153), exclusive of §151, do not operate
to give the first devisee on absolute fee, but merely give him an absolute fee in respect to purchasers,creditors,and encumbrancers.Thus Matter of Sonnenburg, 133
Misc. 42, 231 N. Y. Supp. 191 (Surr. Ct. 1928) holdsithat for taxing purposes,

a devisee for life with a power to use the income and principal does not have
an absolute estate for taxation. It is not within the scope of this article to
deal with taxation of such estates. To the same effect with respect to dowers,
see Barti v. Howell, 85 Misc. 330, 147 N. Y. Supp. 483 (Sup. Ct. 1914).

However, under N. Y. R. P. L. §151, a devisee with a power to use or dispose
of the principal, has a fee where no remainder is limited thereon. Ward v.
Stannard, 82 App. Div. 386, 81 N. Y. Supp. 9o6 (2d Dept. 1903); Ryder v.
Lott, 123 App. Div? 685, lo8 N. Y. Supp. 46 (2d Dept. z9o8), 4ff'd, i99 N. Y
543, 93 N. E. 1131 (ipio) ; West v. West, 215 App. Div. 285, 213 N. Y. Supp.
480 (2d Dept. 1926); Cf. Rose v. Hatch, 125 N. Y. 427, 433, 26 N. E. 467,
469 (189i); -and see Phillips v. Wisner, 75 Misc. 278, x32 N. Y. Supp. soo6
(Sup. Ct 1912), aff'd, 152 App. Div. 911, 137 N. Y. Supp. 1138 (2d1 Dept.
1912). (memo.).
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Property Law, Sections 149-154, and 159. It will be necessary to

have before us the language of the sections:
"§149. When estatefor life or yearsis changed into afee. Where
an absolute power of disposition, not accompanied, by a trust, is
given to the owner of a particular estate for life or for years,
such estate is changed into a fee absolute in respect to the rights
of creditors, purchasers and incunibrancers, but subject to any
future estates limited thereon, in casci the power of absolute disposition is not executed, and the property is not sold for the
satisfaction of debts.
"§150. Certainpowers create a fee. Where a like power of disposition is given to a person to whom no particular estate is
limited, such person also takes a fee, subject to any future estates that may be limited thereon, but absolute in respect to
creditors, purchasers and incumbrancers.
"§151. When grantee of power has absolute fee. Where such a
power of disposition is given, and no remainder is limited on the
estate of the grantee of the power, such grantee is entitled to an
absolute fee.
"§152. Effect of power to devise in certain cases. Where a
general and beneficial power' to devise the inheritance is given
to a tenant for life, or for years, such tenant is deemed to possess an absolute power of disposition within the meaning of and
subject to the provisions of the last three sections.
"§153. When power of disposition absolute. Every power of
disposition by means of which the grantee is enabled, in his lifetime, to dispose of the entire fee for his own benefit, is deemed
absolute.
"§154. Power subject to condition. A general and beneficial
power may be created subject to a condition precedent or subsequent, and until the power becomes absolutely vested it is not
subject to any provisions of the last four sections...
"§159. Beneficial power subject to creditors.A special and beneficial power is liable to the claims of creditors in the :same manner as other interests that can not be reached by execution; and
the execution of the power may be adjudged for the benefit of
the creditors entitled."
Notwithstanding that this statutory system of powers was enacted
with reference to real property, the courts of New York have applied
it equally to disposition of personal property.' This result has been
mHutton v. Benkard, 92 N. Y. 295 (1883) (rule same for personalty as for
real property); Matter of Moehring, 154 N. Y. 423, 48 N. E. 818 (,897)
(to the same effect). On the collateral problen of applying the real property
law with respect to suspension of alienation to personal property, see Whiteside, Suspension of the Power of Alienation in New York, (1928) 13 CORNELL
LAW QUARTERLY, 31 and 75, at 87.
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reached ostensibly by an interpretation of the provision in Personal
Property Law, Section ii, that "...[i]n other respects limitations
of future or contingent interests in personal property, are subject to
the rules prescribed in relation to future estates in real property.'
In fact it has been achieved through the processes of judicial legislation. It m ay be justified on the grounds of convenience, since it
would be most awkward and confusing to administer the statutory
system of powers for real property and a distinct common law system for personal property.
CASEs NOT WITHIN THE STATUTE

Before taking up the rights of creditors, purchasers and remaindermen under these sections, it will be necessary to mention briefly
-Not all the states which adopted a statutory system of powers are inaccord
with New York in applying those statutes to personal property.

It is not clear that Alabama also applies its system of(powers to personalty.
See Braley v. Spragins, 221 Ala. i5o, 128 So. 149 (193o), where in construing
a will devising real and personal property, the court made no distinction between the two. The court, however, was concerned only with an action for
partition of the real property devised under the will. Cf. Pitts v. Howard, 208
Ala. 380, 94 So. 495 (1922), where the court interpreted the language of the
litigated will as devising an absolute interest in the personal property and a
life estate plus a power as to the real property. ALA. CODE ANN. (1ga8)
§6937 provides: "When a disposition under a power is directed to be made by,
between, or among several persons, without specifying the sum or share to be
allotted to each.. .all the persons designated are entitled to an equal proportion; but when the terms of the power import that the estate or fund to be distributed.. ." (Italics are the writers'). This would seem to indicate that the
legislature intended to include personal property within the scope of the system
of powers.
The following states limit the statute on powers to real property: D. C.
CODE (1929) tit. 25, §391; MrcH. ComP. LAws (1929) §12996; MINN. STAT.
(Mason, 1927) §8108; N. D. CoMp. LAws ANN. (913) §5381; OKLA. CoMP.
STAT. ANN. (1921) §8482; S. D. ComP. LAws (1929) §388.

Wisconsin follows New York and makes its system of powers applicable to
personal property. Cawker v. Dreutzer, 197 Wis. 98, 221 N. W. 4oi (1928).
See Rundell, Perpetuities in Personal Property in Wisconsin, (1926) 4 Wis.
L. REv. I. discussing Wisconsin legislative enactments which followed New
York.
"Cf. the language of Chief Judge Andrews in Cochrane v. Schell, 14o N. Y.
516, 534, 35 N. F. 971, 976 (1894). "There is a, manifest propriety in assimilating as far as practicable the rules governing trusts and limitations of real
and personal property, and the tendency in this direction has been very marked

in the decisions of the courts... It.would be unfortunate, we think, if it was
necessary to distinguish between trusts of real and personal property for the
payment of annuities out of income, holding such trusts valid as to one species
of property and void as to the other."

I
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certain cases which, by reason of the interpretation of the conveyance
or devise, are taken out of the scope of the statute.
It may sufficiently appear that the testator did not intend the life
tenant to have any power to consume or convey. Thus, in Matter of
Felt," the testator; after specific devises and bequests, gave the residue
of his real and personal property to his wife "to have and use during
her lifetime", and by subsequent clauses of the will he disposed of
$25,000 in bequests "upon the death of my wife", and provided for a
gift overt the residue upon her death. These dispositions showed that
the language first used did not authorize her to consume the principal in her lifetime. So also, in Mee v. Gordon,' an apparently absolute gift to the testatrix' brother was cut down by a modifying clause
in which she directed that the share of the brother should be invested
for his benefit during life, and for his wife and issue after his) death.
On the other hand, the court may be convinced that the estate conveyed is not intended as a life estate, with a power to consume, but as
an absolute fee. In Crain v. Wright,' the testator devised fifty acres
to his widow "to have and to hold for her support". The will contained a residuary clause in favor of the testator's son. The court
interpreted the gift to the wife as a fee absolute," not cut down by
the general residuary clause in favor of the son. In Tillnux v.
Ogren,' a gift of a residue to the testatrix' husband, his heirs and
assigns, "with the understanding" that at his decease all of the estate
remaining undisposed of "he shall give" to A, was interpreted as
conveying the estate to the husband absolutely."
Where the grantor creates a trust for his own benefit or for the
benefit of another for life, with or without power in the trustee to
reconvey, sell or dispose of the property, followed by a direction that
6235 N. Y. 374, 139 N. E. s45 (i923).
M6i87 N. Y. 400, go N. E. 353 (Io7).
7114
N. Y. 307, 2i N. E. 401 (i889).
'It is interesting to note that the court might have reached the same result
under §i49. Here the widow sold the property and the plaintiff-purhaser took
title through her. Under §149 the purchaser would have taken a fee simple.
The court, however, rests its decision on its interpretation of the will as stated
above.
"Supra note 2.
"See Matter of Enright, 1O9 Misc. 337, 179 N. Y. Supp. 757 (Surr. Ct 1919),
where the court in construing a will, interpreted the words limiting the gift
over to be merelyf precatory, and hence the first devisee took an absolute fee.
It is interesting to note that the court also relied on R. P. L. §§149-I53, insofar
as it says that if the words of the gift over are precatory, there is no remainder,
and the devisee would take a fee simple absolute by virtue of R. P. L. §151.
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upon the death of the life beneficiary the trustee give the property
remaining to the grantor's heirs or next of kin, the heirs or next of
kin take no estate but only an expectancy.oa All interests not conveyed to the trustee for the life beneficiaries remain in the grantor,
and the direction to the trustee to convey to heirs or next of kin is
without legal effect. This is, however, a rule of construction, and
may be varied by the disclosure of an intention on the grantor's part
to vest in his heirs or next of kin an estate or interest.'b
We are not, therefore, concerned with settlements in which by
construction the life tenant has no power to dispose of the remainder,
nor with those in which by construction the first taker has an absolute and indefeasible interest. Where the interpretation is that the
settlor of a trust is the absolute owner of the interests remaining
after the termination of the trust, he has the rights of an owner over
this remainder or reversion, but not by virtue of the statute on
powers. If the settlor is also the cestui que trust, and the trustee has
the power to reconvey o14 dispose of the property for the benefit of
the cestui, this does not present the case of a life tenant with a power
over the remainder, since he is the owner of the remainder. If, however, the trust is for the benefit of another, with power in the life
beneficiary to encroach upon, or appoint the settlor's reversion, the
problems are the same as those discussed below in connection with
trusts for life with added powers over the remaindermen.
RIGHTS OF, CREDITORS UNDER THE STATUTORY SYSTEM OF POWERS

Prior to the Revised Statutes, as we have seen, a creditor could
reach property in which his debtor had a life estate with a general
'0aDoctor v. Hughes, .225 N. Y. 3o5, 122 N. E. 221 (i9ig), where the court
held that the ostensible remaindermen had no rights. Cf. In re' Hughes, 262
Fed. 5oo (C. C. A. 2d, igig), where the bankrupt remainderman failed to
schedule his "interest" in the property which was litigated in Doctor v. Hughes.
The Federal court held that there was no concealment of assets, as the remainderman had no interest in the real property. See also Livingston v. Ward,
247 N. Y. 97, 159 N. E. 875 (1929).
'%bIn Whittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., 250 N. Y. 298, 165 N. E. 454 (1929),
the situation was summarized by the court as follows: "...we have a trust

created in personal property for the life of the beneficiary. At the death of
the life beneficiary, the trustee is directed to do one of three things: pay the
principal of the estate to the settlor, if he be alive; or, if he be dead, to pay
it as directed in the settlor's last will... ; or, if the settlor leave no will, to
pay it to the persons who would then take under the Statute of Distributions!'
It was held that the next of kin of each settlor had a vested remainder, and that
the trust could not be revoked, under R. P. L. §23 without the consent of the
minor children of the settlor, these children being beneficially .interested and
unablo to consent to revocation because they were minors.
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power to appoint the remainder for his own benefit, provided the
debtor exercised the power, notwithstanding that he exercised it in
favor of someone other than the creditor. Equity said that the debtor
must exercise his power in favor of his creditor if he exercised it
at all. But if the debtor refused to exercise his power, the creditor
was without remedy. ' These rules were abolished upon the adoption
of the statutory system discussed above.'
The Revised Statutes, however, creates new remedies for the
creditor. Section 149 of the Real Property Law, quoted above, enables him to reach the property over which his debtor has a power,
just as if the debtor had a fee absolute, provided: (a) the power
is an absolute power of disposition, not accompanied by a trust; (b)
the debtor is the owner of a particular estate for life or for years;
and (c) notwithstanding any future estate limited thereon, if the
power is not executed. Section 150 gives the creditor the same rights
where his debtor has a like power but no particular estate in the land.
Under Section 151, the grantee of the powers enumerated in Sections
149 and i5o takes an absolute fee for all purposes if no remainder
is limited on his estate. "Absolute power of disposition" is defined
in Sections 152 and 153. Under Section 152, a tenant for life or for
years who has a general and beneficial power to devise the inheritance,
has the absolute power of disposition; under Section 153, every power
by means of which the grantee is enabled, in his lifetime, "to dispose
of the entire fee for his own benefit", is deemed an absolute power
of disposition.' a While these sedions do not in terms exclude the possibility that other powers may be absolute powers of disposition, the
tendency of the courts, as we shall see, has been to interpret them
narrowly and as requiring the creditor to prove that the power in
question falls squarely within their provisions.
The chief problem, then, in delimiting the rights of creditors, is
to decide whether the grantee of the power has the absolute power
of disposition specified in the statute. If he does not have this absolute power of disposition, then the creditor can not invoke the protection of the statute. Moreover, he is without remedy under the previous common law system which was supplanted by the statute.
"'See discussion supra note 5. See also, KALES, op. cit. supra note 3, §638.
IN. Y. R. P. L. §130; See Cutting v. Cutting, mpra note 8; Hutton v. Benkard, supra note 32.
'-aPROE.RTY RESTATEMENT, op. cit. supra note 22a, §155 deals with life estates
and powers and the Reporter recognizes the effect of such statutes as §149 et. seq.
as to the protection of creditors.
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The typical situation in which a creditor of the grantee of the
power may treat the interest of the grantee as equivalent to an absolute fee is illustrated in Matter of Davies." Fannie Davies devised and
bequeathed real and personal property to her husband, David L.
Davies, "...for use during his natural life, giving him full power
to expend the principal, income, interest, rent and profits as he may
see fit, upon his death such part of the principal, income, interest,
rent and profits as may be unexpended, I direct shall be paid to my
son Joseph Jones or his issue." After the death of David, his
creditors claimed certain real property so devised, as against the son,
David not having conveyed it. It was held, under Sections 149-153,
that as to creditors, David had a fee absolute which the creditors
could reach after his death. The right of a creditor is even more
clear where there is no gift over in default of exercise of the power."
The problem is not, however, always so simple. Sections 149-153
afford no protection to creditors of the grantee of a power unless
(a) the power is for the sole benefit of the grantee, (b) it is absolute in the sense that it is not limited by any contingency," and (c)
unless the grantee is enabled irnhis lifetime to dispose of the entire
fee for his own benefit, whether or not he be a tenant for life or
years, or is a tenant for life or years with a general and beneficial
power to devise the inheritance.
Where the grantee of the power may sell, but must hold the proceeds in whole or in part for others, his power is not beneficial but
in trust," and it is obvious that ,his creditor should not be allowed
"242 N. Y.

i96,

1I

N. E. 2o5 (1926).

'Wendt v. Walsh, 164 N. Y. i54, 58 N. E. 2 (igoo); Ward v. Stannard;
West v. West, both suspra note 31. And see Ryder v. Lott, supra note 31. It is

not clear, in the latter case, whether the rights of creditors were involved, but
the court says that the devisee had an absolute fee.
'IN. Y. R. P. L. §154; Taggart v. Murray, 53 N. Y. 233 (1873) (contingency
that life tenant leave no heirs). See Trustees of Theological Seminary of
Auburn v. Kellogg, supra note 20;Rose v. Hatch, supra note
Downs, ioi App. Div. iig, 9I N. Y. Supp. 937 (2d Dept. i9o5).

i; Higgins v.

'IN.Y. R. P. L. §137; Kinnier v. Rogers, 42 N. Y. 531 (1870) (executor
with power to sell realty could convey good title free from the claims of .the
devisor's creditors) ;Dana v. Murray, i22 N. Y. 6o4, 26 N. E. 21 (i89o) (executor empowered to sell property had to hold proceeds for the cestuis) ; Townshend v. Frommer, 125 N. Y. 446, 26 N. E. 8o5 (t8gi).
N. Y. R. P. L. §99 provides that if a trust fails, because directed to an
unauthorized purpose, the trustee gets a power. For a discussion of this point,
see Whiteside, op. cit. supra note 32, at 34. But cf. Murray v. Miller, 178 N. Y.
316, 7o N. E. 87o (i9o4) holding that where a trust for an unincorporated

charity is invalid, the uower in trust is likewise invalid.
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to reach the property or the proceeds, at least to the extent that the
grantee holds for the benefit of others' That the creditor can not
reach any part of the property is clear, since the grantee's power is
not beneficial as is required by both Sections 152 and 153 for an
absolute power of disposition; nor may the grantee's creditor proceed under Section 159, where the power is in trust, since that section also applies only where the power is beneficial.
Where the grantee's power is general and beneficial, but subject to
a condition, it is not an absolute power of disposition until the condition happens and the power becomes absolutely vested.' Consequently, until the condition happens, creditors are entitled to no protection
under Sections 149-153. This limitation is important where a life
tenant or other grantee can consume or convey for necessary support
and maintenance only."9 While the courts are not inclined to substitute
' TIn Haynes v. Sherman, ii7 N. Y. 433, 22 N. E. 938 (1899), there was a
devise to W in. trust, to hold the estate and use so much of the income and
principal as she might deem necessary for the support of herself and the children, with provision to divide the estate among T's legal heirs living when
the youngest child reached 21. The court held that the trust for more than
two lives was invalid; and that W did not have the absolute power to dispose
of the estate, since she was clothed with a power for the benefit of the children.
There were no creditors' rights involved in the case. See Matter of Davies,
supra note 43, at 200, 151 N. E., at 2o6, where the court speaking of §i49, says:
"In order to avail themselves [the creditors] of ,its provisions they must show
first, that the decedent received an absolute power of disposition within the
meaning of the statute;..." Cf. Ackerman v. Gorton, 67 N. Y. 63 (1876).
Here there was a devise of land to W for life, remainder to the children equally.
W was authorized to sell subject to the approval of all the testator's heirs surviving at the time of sale. There was a sale by W in accordance with the condition. Although a judgment had been docketed against one of the children
prior to the sale, the court held that W could convey a good title and suggested that the judgment creditor could proceed against the money realized
at the sale. See also, Dana v. Murray, supra note 46.
See N. Y. R. P. L. §162 which offers a remedy for creditors of a cestui que trust.
4
A conditional power is illustrated by Ackerman v. Gorton, supra note 47
(life tenant empowered to sell upon receiving the consent o all the heirs);
Beers v. Grant, io App. Div. 152, 97 N. Y. Supp. 117 (ist Dept i9o5) aff'd,
185 N. Y. 533, 77kN. E. ii8I (i9o6) memo. (power to devise principal it the
donee died unmarried). The American Bible Society v. Stark, 45 How. Pr.
i6o (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1873) is an example -f a condition satisfied. Hume v.
Randall, 141 N. Y. 499, 36 N. E. 402 (1894) illustrates a condition that was
discharged.
'"Terry v. Wiggins, supra note I9; Terry v. St. Stephens Church, 79 App.
Div. 527, 8I N. Y. Supp. iig (4th Dept. i9o3) (the lifef tenant with a power
to dispose as she should deem fit could not give the property away to charity).
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their discretion for that of the grantee of the power,'" and there may
be a presumption that his disposition was within the terms of the
power,' it seems that the grantee must at least consume or convey in
good faith, and can not give away the property shortly before his
death without receiving any benefit or consideration.'
If the grantee's power is subject to an outstanding estate or charge,
it seems that he is not able to dispose of the entire fee for his own
benefit, and consequently that he does not have an absolutei power of
disposition.' Likewise, it has been decided that the power of disposition is not absolute where the life beneficiary of a trust of real
or personal property has a beneficial power of appointment over the
inheritance, by deed or will; a fortiori, if the power,'is to appoint by
will only.5 '
In Cutting v. Cutting," real property was devised to trustees for
the benefit of F for life, and upon his death the trustees were directed
to convey the estate as F should by will appoint. F died, appointing
In Hasbrouck v. Knoblauch, 13o App. Div. 378, 114 N. Y. Supp. 949 (ist
Dept. 19o9), there was a devise to W "for her use and behoof during her
natural life, she to have absolute control and disposal of all the income to be
derived... and so much principal as she may deem necessary." In construing
the will the courf held that the right to dispose was limited to maintenance and
support. To the same effect, see Matter of Hunt, 38 Misc. 30, 76 N. Y. Supp.
968 (Surr. Ct. 19o2), aff'd, 84 App. Div. 159, 82 N. Y. Supp. 539 (3d Dept.
1903), aff'd, 179 N. Y. 570, 72 N. E. 1143 (19o4) memo.

With the foregoing cases, compare the following, where the courts reached
a different result as a matter of interpretation. Rose v. Hatch, supra note 31;
Swarthout v. Ranier, 143 N. Y. 499, 38 N. E. 726 (1894). In Matter of Briggs,
ioi Misc. 19i,167 N. Y. Supp. 632 (Surr. Ct. 1917), in construing a will
which devised property to a life tenant with a power to use so much of the
principal, within his lifetime, as was in his judgment necessary and proper,
the surrogate held that the life tenant had the absolute power of disposition
and would not be liable for any property used within the Wide limits oA his discretion. In 18o App. Div. 752, 168 N. Y. Supp. 597 (3d Dept

1917),

the Ap-

pellate Division modified the Surrogate's order, and said that the life tenant
could not encroach: on the principal while he had property of his own. In 223
N. Y. 677, iig N. E. 1O32 (i918) memo., the Court of Appeals reversed the
Appellate Division and restored the judgment of the Surrogate.
'Matter of Fitzpatrick, 252 N. Y. 121, 124, 169 N. E. iO, iii (x929).

'Swarthout v. Ranier, supra note 49, where the remaindermen and a pur.
chaser from the first taker were involved, but the principle is, the same.
'Vincent v. Rix, 248 N. Y. 76, x61 N. E. 425 (1928).
"Jackson v. Edwards, 22 Wend. 498 (N. Y. 1839).
'Matter of Hayman, 134 Misc. 803, 237 N. Y. Supp. 215 (Surr. Ct. 1929),
aff'd, 229 App. Div. 853, 243 N. Y. Supp. 8o3 (Ist Dept 193o).
'Supra note 8.
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to W. The plaintiff, a judgment creditor of F, attempted to reach
the property, which he might have done prior to the Revised Statutes. The court thought that F's power was general and beneficial,
and not a power in trust, but that it was not an absolute power of
disposition within the provisions of Sections 152 and 153. The difficulty was that the life beneficiary of the trust could not convey his
life interest. He could not therefore convey the entire fee, as required
by Section 153, though he could dispose of the interest in remainder
absolutely.' Apparently also he was, not a tenant for life within the
provisions of Section 152, or if so, he was not able to convey the
entire fee." The creditor could not, therefore, bring his case within
Sections 149-153, and since the legislature had abolished the common law remedies, his action failed.' The result is the same where
'It may be questioned whether the Revisers intended that §153 should provide only for the case where the grantee had a beneficial power to convey an
entire or absolute fee. It may be argued that the power to convey a remainder
in fee comes within the spirit of this section. Cf. R. P. L. §§30, 31, 38. Why
should the immediate grantee's creditors be protected where he can dispose of
an absolute fee, and not where he can dispose of a remainder in fee? Cf. Scheer
v. Long Island R. R., 127 App. Div. 267, 111 N. Y. Supp. 569 (2d Dept. i9o8),
aff'd, 2oo N. Y. 558, 93 N. E. 1131 (i91i), where it seems that a cestid of a
naked or passive trust can convey a fee. While no creditors' rights were involved in the Scheer case it would seem that if the cestui of a naked or passive
trust can convey a good title, creditors of the cestui can reach the property
under R P. L. §§149-I53. In Long Island R. R. v. Mury, 212 N. Y. io8, io5
N. E. 8o6 (914), the Court of Appeals intimated, that it overruled the Scheer
case, but on an entirely different point, i. e. prescription. On the collateral
point of passive trusts generally, see Whiteside, op. cit supra note 32, at 35.
"Crooke v. County of Kings, 97 N. Y. 421 (1884); Farmer's Loan & Trust
Co. v. Kip, 192 N. Y. 266, 85 N. E. 59 (19o8), where the court in discussing
the absolute power of disposition within the meaning of §153, says that the
word "entire" means the right oi the donee to give possession as well as title;
Dudley v. People's Trust Co., 57 Misc. 230, lO7 N. Y. Supp. 93o (Sup. Ct.
1907), where the court says that a power of disposition is not absolute while
the trust lasts, because of the inability to convey an entire fee including the
present estate; Matter of Hayman, supra note 54, to the effect that there is no
absolute power of disposition where the cestui is not enabled in his own lifetime to dispose of the entire fee for his own benefit.
Cf. N. Y. R. P. L. §6o (the cestui has no. estate or interest in the lands).
For a discussion of this, see Whiteside, op. cit. supra note 32, at 41.
'InHiggins v. Downs, supra note 45, there was a devise of property to trustees in trust for the use of A, Nwith a power in A 'to appoint by will, but if he
die intestate over. On an action by a judgment creditor to reach the fund, the
court held that A did not have an absolute power because of the trust. The
power was further complicated by the fact that the trust was to continue until
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the life beneficiary of a trust can dispose of the remainder by deed
or will.a

It follows that in this field the statute denies all remedies to creditors in situations where they had at least a partial remedy in equity
before the adoption of the statute. In effect, the Cutting case enables
the owner of property to give it in trust to F for life, conferring
upon him an absolue power to dispose of the remainder by will,
free from all liability to his creditors. F's will operates as a conduit
for passing the property from the original owner to the ultimate
grantee.
It may be suggested that no compelling reason of logic or policy,
and no precedent, requires the courts to deny to creditors of the
grantee of a power the right to satisfy their judgments by a sale of
the remainder where the life beneficiary of a trust has a power to
appoint the remainder for his own benefit. The result reached by the
court in the Cutting case is inconsistent with the avowed object of
the Revisers.' There is nothing in Sections 149-153 which expressly
excludes from their operation the case where a power of disposition,
by will or otherwise, is given to the life beneficiary of a trust in the
same property.' Furthermore, it may be suggested that the life
beneficiary of a trust has no estate or interest in the property within
A reached 5o, at which time the trustees, irk their discretion, could terminate it.
The court, however, suggested that (a) there was a contingent interest in the
remaindermen, (b) A took a;descendible, devisable and alienable estate (R. P.
L. §59) to which the lien of the plaintiff's judgment attached, and this interest
could be sold upon execution. It is submitted that this is not a very practicable
remedy for creditors, since the purchaser would become the owner of a future
expectant estate contingent upon events that might never happen.
'aFarmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Kip, supral note 57.
'See discussion of the notes of the Revisers, supra page 454'The phrase "not accompanied by a trust" in §149 limits "power of disposition" and not "estate". In Stafford v. Washburn, 145 App. Div. 784, 13o N. Y.
Supp. 571 (Ist Dept. 19ri), Laughlin, J., dissenting, upon whose opinion the
Court of Appeals reversed the majority in 208 N. Y. 536, 161 N. E. 1122
(1913) memo., says, at 797, 13o N. Y. Supp., at 580: "The statutory definition
of an absolute power of disposition sheds light on what was meant by the words
'not accompanied by a trust'. When the proceeds of the disposition of the
property are held in part for the benefit of anotheii or others, then there is a
trust within the contemplation of the statute." In that case there was a gift
of all thel personal estate to W to have and to hold to her use forever; all real
property to be used and enjoyed for life, after her death one house and lot as
W should choose to Mary, remainder of property over. Laughlin, J., in his
dissent held that if W sold, as she did, she had to hold the proceeds for the
remaindermen.
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the meaning of the Revised Statutes." And, if so, the case does not
fall within Sections 149 or 152, since the grantee is not a tenant for
life or for years, but "a person to whom no particular estate is
limited" within Section i5o, and he can dispose of the entire renzainder in fee, everl if he can not dispose of the entire fee. Nothing
in the statute requires that he be able to convey the entire fee in
possession.' Finally, even if the life beneficiary of a trust who has a
beneficial power of appointment over the remainder, does not have
the absolute power of disposition,' he most certainly has a special
and beneficial power within Section 159, and it seems that his creditors should be able to reach his interest in remainder by a creditor's
bill under that section." By this means, the execution of the life
beneficiary's .special and beneficial power over the remainder may be
adjudged for the benefit of hig creditors.
To summarize, the cases hold, then, that creditors of the grantee
of a power can look to the property subject to the power if the
grantee can, in his lifetime, dispose of the entire fee for his own
benefit; or if he is a tenant for life or years and has a general and
beneficial power to devise the inheritance. In these situations, a
creditor can reach the property as the absolute property of the grantee,
whether or not he executes the power, and notwithtstanding a provision for a gift over of a remainder in default of his execution of
the power. To this limited extent the rights of the creditor have
been enlarged over those which he had prior to the Revised Statutes.
But the power of disposition is not considered absolute, and creditors
are not entitled to the protection ofi "the statute, if the interest of the
grantee is conditional or subject to any outstanding estate or charge,
or if the grantee's life interest is in trust" and his power extends
"Whiteside, op. cit. supra note 32, at 41.
"Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Kip; Dudley v. People's Trust Co., both
supra note 57.
"'"Absolute power of disposition" within the meaning of §153 should not be
copfused with the absolute, as distinguished from conditional, power of a cestin
to encroach upon the principal. Thus in Matter of Briggs, discussed supra
note 49, the court was concerned with determining whether the cestui's right
to encroach upon the principal of a trust was conditioned upon his showing the
need for comfort and support; and the court, finding that the cestid did not
have to use his own income before he could encroach upon the corpus, said
that his power was absolute.
"Apparently the courts have not considered the application of this 'section.
See Cutting v. Cutting, supra note 8, at 541, where the court speaks of REv. STAT4
§93, now R. P. L. §159.
"Query as to the results the eourt would reach in the following cases: (a)
where the settlor is also cestui que trust, since in this case his interest can be
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only to the remainder. It seems, however, that creditors might in
these situations profitably proceed under Section 159.
RIGHTS OF PURCHASERS AND INCUMBRANCERS

The interests of purchasers and incumbrancers under the statu-

tory system have been partly covered in connection with the discussion of the rights of creditors above. The problem presents no difficulty where the grantee of an absolute power of disposition conveys
or incumbers the property in accordance therewith." Even if the
grantee's power is special, or in trust or conditional, purchasers and
incumbrancers will be fully protected where the grantee executes
the power strictly in accordance with its terms. But a special power,
or a power in trust, must ordinarily be executed in accordance with
the direction of the grantor.'
Whether such a power has been
properly executed is often a questiort of some nicety with which we
are not here concerned. Sections 149-153 include only powers that
are general and beneficial. But the grantor may specifly that a general
and beneficial power must be executed only by a conveyance in the
lifetime of the grantor, or by will, or in either manner.'
alienated; see Whiteside, op. cit. supra note 32, at 46; cf. Doctor v. Hughes,
mtpra note 4oa.
(b) Whereby the terms of the trust instrument the cestui
can terminate the trust. It would seem in both these situations that his interest
is absolute and so should be available to creditors.
'The remaindermen will take unless the power is properly executed. Thus
in Jackson v. Edwards, supra note 53, where an attempt was made to execute
a general and beneficial power by a decree in partition, instead of by deed
or will, it was held that the property would pass to the purchasers subject to
the rights of remaindermen.
'Kinnier v. Rogers, supra note 46 (executors could convey'good title under
a valid power in trust to convert realty into personalty) ; Ackerman v. Gorton,
supra note 47 (donee under a conditional power, requiring the consent of all
heirs, can convey good title when the heirs consent); Swarthout v. Ranier,
supra note 49 (where the power to dispose is conditional on the first taker's
"comfort and support", there is a presumption that the power was validly
exercised).
61N. Y. R. P. L. §172; Allen v. DeWitt, 3 N. Y. 276, 278 (i88o); see Ackerman v. Gorton, supra note 47.
IN. Y. R. P. L. §§167-168; Terry v. Wiggin, supra note i; Matter of
Cager, ii N. Y. 343, i8 N. E. 866 (1888); Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v.
Mortimer, 219 N. Y. 290, 114 N E.. 389 (1916); Matter of Ithaca Trust Co.,
supra note 22. Cf. Hayes v. Gunning, 51 -Misc. 517, ioi N. Y. Supp. 875 (Sup.
Ct. 19o6) for a peculiar interpretation of a devise for life, with a power to use
and dispose, where the court interpreted this language to include a power to
devise.
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If a tenant for life or for years is granted the general and beneficial power to consume or convey the inheritance, either in his lifetime or by will, aid no future estates are limited thereon, it is clear
that his creditors or purchasers and incumbrancers from him are
fully protected. Moreover, the grantee of the power is entitled to an
absolute fee under Section 151. In Hume v. Randall,' V conveyed
by deed to X and Y for life, providing that neither should have the
right to convey away the property without the written consent of
the grantor. The court interpreted this provision as giving X and Y
the absolute power to convey by deed or will after the death of V,
and held that X and Y could convey good title after V's death,n
stating that the case was controlled by ,Section 152.
Hunte v. Randall was followed in Deegan v. Wade," where, however, the facts were soriewhat different. Real property was devised
to a son for life, with a power to devise but not to convey, and if he
die intestate, remainder to his heirs. In an action to construe the
will, the court said that the case was controlled by Hunve v. Randall,
that the son took an absolute estate, and that the attempt to restrain
a conveyance by deed was inoperative. It seems that in Deeganv. Wade
the grantee did not take an absolute fee since a future estate was
provided for if the power should not be executed.n Creditors would
be protected equally in the two cases, but in Deegan v. Wade purchasers and incumbrancers would not be protected unless they claimed
through a devise.
Where a general and beneficial power to devise the inheritance
is given to a tenant for life or for years, and no remainder is limited
over in default of his exercise of the power, it seems that he should
be able to convey the entire estate in possession immediately by deed
"Supra note 48.
supra note 8 (life tenant had an equitable interest).
"I44 N. Y. 573, 39 N. E. 692 (1895).
'Livingston v. Murray, 68 N. Y. 485 (1877) involved the construction of a
will whereby the testator devised his residuary estate to children for their
separate use during their natural lives, remainder to their lawful issue, subject
to the right of each child to dispose one-half of his share by will. It was held
that the power to dispose of a moiety by will did not enlarge the life tenant's
estate into - fee. And see Taggart v. Murray, supra note 45, where the testator
devised property to C for her comfort and support, and at her death to her
heirs; but if she were to leave no heirs the property was to be disposed of by
C's will. The court held that C took a life estate with a power in default of
issue, to appoint by will. Consequently a conveyance by C and her living children did not convey an absolute title, as it was subject to the contingency that
children might be born who would take an interest as purchasers under the will.
'Cf. Cutting v. Cutting,
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or other conveyance or by will. ,' Where, however, a remainder is
limited over, it seems that the interests of the remaindermen can not
be cut off except by a devise in strict accordance ivith the terms of
the power."6
If the grantor directs that the grantee may consume or dispose of
the property for his support or maintenance, but subject to a gift
over of all that remains undisposed of at his death, this does not give
the grantee a power to devise the property. He can, by the execution
of the power in his lifetime, convey to purchasers and incumbrancers,
but his devisees and legatees will not prevail over remaindermen. This
result has been reached by the Court of Appeals"6 in a number of
cases and, furthermore, it clearly follows from the language of Section 149 that the estate of the grantee with an absolute power of disposition is changed into a fee, "subject to any future estates limited
thereon, in case the power of absolute disposition is not executed.
and the property is not sold for the satisfaction of debts."
As between creditors of the grantee and purchasers or incumbrancers claiming under him, it seems that the statute gives no preference.' A creditor might, of course, be able to reach the property
in the hands of a purchaser or incumbrancer, on the ground that the
debtor had conveyed in fraud of creditors, but not by virtue of anything in the statute on powers.
A discussion of the doctrine of relation in the law of powers is
not within the scope of this paper.' but it is apparent that if the
71N. Y. R. P. L. §151; Matter of Moehring, supra note 32; Matter of Lynn,
34 Misc. 681, 7o N. Y. Supp. 73o (Surr. Ct. igoi).

'The rule is the same where. there is a trust. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v.
Mortimer, supra note 69. In this case the life beneficiary of a trust had a power
to devise the inheritance. The court held that he could not be held on a contract
to devise when he subsequently executed a will which made a different disposition. Accord: Central Trust Co. v. Dewey, 179 App. Div. 112, 166 N. Y. Supp.
214 (Ist Dept. 1917), aff'd, 223 N. Y. 726, 12o N. E. 859 (1918). Bitt cf.
Freeborn v. Wagner, 49 Barb. 43 (N. Y. 1867), aff'd, 4 Keyes 27 (N. Y.
1868).
"6See cases cited .supra note 57. See also Vincent v. Rix, .tpra note 52.

"In Rose v. Hatch, supra-note 31, a person claiming land under a judgment
sale was subordinated to a subsequent purchaser claiming under execution of
the grantee's power, but the power was construed as not an absolute power of
disposition.
"For a discussion of the doctrine of relation back in the law of powers, see
Marsh, Perpetuities Arising Through the Power of Appointment (1925) 25
CoL. L. RFv. 521. For a recent case discussing this problem, see Matter of
Hayman, supra note 54.
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first power is executed so as to create a second power which is
within the condemnation of this doctrine, then no purchaser or
creditor claiming under an exercise of the second power can succeed.
RIGHTS OF

REMAINDERMEN

In the statement of the rights of the grantee's creditors and purchasers above, the rights of the remainderman have been covered
substantially. Obviously, to the extent that the rights of creditors,
purchasers and incumbrancers are protected, the future estate limited
in defaul4 of an exercise of the power is defeated. The rights of remaindermen are protected only in respect of property that has not
been taken by creditors or validly conveyed to purchasers. Creditors
of the grantee of the power can defeat the remainderman by a sale of
the property on execution, if the grantee has an absolute power of
disposition. Purchasers from the grantee can defeat the claims of
the remainderman only if they take through a proper execution of the
power. ' Neither the grantee 'of the power nor the settlor who has
reserved a power, has any greater right."a Thus, a gift by will of
real and personal property to the testator's widow for life, "for her
sole use and benefit during her lifetime", does not convey a fee,
where it is followed by a gift over of all that remains at her death."
Where the grantee has an absolute and unconditional power to consume or convey the principal for his own benefit, the reninderman can
reach only that portion which is not consumed or disposed of by the
grantee.' If, however, the power is conditional, or limited to actual
need, or otherwise restricted, the rights of the remainderman are
correspondingly increased'
It may be difficult to prove What remains undisposed of at the grantee's death, or to trace the property,
particularly if it is personalty, but the burden of proof falls upon
the remainderman?
The principle is not changed where the life beneficiary of a trust
is entitled to encroach on the principal for his maintenance and support, and the gift over is only of so much as remains. The trustee
can be compelled by the committee of a beneficiary, now incompetent,
"'Matter of Fitzpatrick, supra note 50; see Guaranty Trust Co. v. Halsted,
245 N. Y. 447, 157 N. E. 739 (1927).
1aWhittemore v. Equitable Trust Co., see the, discussion supra note 4ob.
""Keefe v. Keefe, 23o App. Div. 654, 246 N. Y. Supp. 389 (3d Dept. 193o).
"Matter of Fitzpatrick, supra note 5o; Matter of Marshall v. Marshall, 217
App. Div. 229, 216 N. Y. Supp. 673 (4th Dept. 1926).
"Trustees of Theological Seminary of Auburn v. Kellogg, supra'note 20.
'Seaward v. Davis, supra note 14.
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to apply the funds necessary for his support, even to the exclusion
of the remaindermen."
Where real or personal property is conveyed or devised to A for
life, with power in A to consume or dispose of it for his support
and maintenance, followed by gift over of all that remains undisposed of at his death, A cannot defeat the remainderman by a testamentary disposition.' Conversely, it has been held that a power given
to a life tenant to dispose of the remainder by will for his own benefit,
does not enlarge his estate into a fee as against a remainderman to
whom the property was limited in default of an exercise of the
power.' Both results seem to be in accord with the statute. Similarly, in Farmers'Loan and Trust Co. v. Mortimer," it was held that
a power given to a life beneficiary of a trust, to dispose of the
property by his last will, did not protect one to whom he contracted
to bequeath it before his death, the grantee of the power having subsequently made a new will.
It appears, then, that creditors of the grantee of the power can
defeat a remainderman to whom the property is limited in default
of an execution of the power, provided the grantee has the absolute
power of disposition defined in Sections 152 and 153.

If the power

is special and beneficial, it seems that the remainderman can be cut
.off by a creditor's bill under Section i59. Otherwise the remainderman can be defeated only by a proper execution of the power, as
directed by the grantor.
' 4 Rezzemini v. Brooks, 236 N. Y. 184, i4o N. E. 237 (1923) ; see also Doctor
v. Hughes, supra note 4oa. See Matter of Fordham, 235 N. Y. 384, 139 N. E.
548 (1923), illustrating the acceleration of a remainder following a life trust
with power to consume the corpus, the life beneficiary having predeceased the
testatrix.
"See discussion sup-Ya page 463. The remaindermen can also compel a reconveyance of property where the devisee conveyed to X without consideration and
while she was incompetent. Callahan v. Volke, 220 App. Div. 379, 222 N. Y.
Supp. 49 (3d Dept. 1927).

'Livingston v. Murray, supra note 73, at 491; Contra: Deegan v. Wade,
supra note 72.
'Supra note 69.

